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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-PART PERFORMANCE-In Schwartzfager v.
Pittsburgh Ry., 238 Pa. 158 (1913). the plaintiff, who had been injured by defendant, executed a release of all claims arising from that injury in return for
payment of his expenses and wages during his enforced idleness. The defendant
paid his expenses, but failed to pay him his wages. The plaintiff tendered the
money received and sued for damages. His recovery in the lower court was
sustained on the ground that an accord and satisfaction is not a bar to a recovery on the original action whether there has been a failure of consideration
in whole or in part. The consideration in the accord and satisfaction was said
td be in this case the payment of the expenses and wages and not the mere promise to pay.
This case simply applies the well settled rule that an accord and satisfaction
is not complete until there has been full performance. 3 Blackstone's Com.
x5; Peytoo g case, A Coke p; Hear v. Kiehl, 38 Pa. 147 (186,). Part performance is not suficient; Memphis v. Brown, 20 Wall. 289 (U. S., z873), nor
is part performance with a tender of the residue. Noe v. Christie, Si N. Y.
270 (1873); Kromer v. Heinm, 75 N. Y. 574 (t879). So where the defendant has
refused to complete the performance of the release there is all the more reatom
for holding it no bar to recovery in the original action. Saeger v. Runk, 148
Pa. 77 (1892).
These cases where performance alone is the consideration for the release,
and when the agreement is purely executory, should be distinguished from those
cases when the release is made in consideration of a mere promise to perform.
In the latter the agreements are binding from the date of their execution and
operate as a complete bar to the original action. Hosler v. Hursh, x5z Pa.
147 (892); Laughhead v. Coke Co., 209 Pa. 368 (1904); Fields v. Aldrick, z62
Mass. 587 (x895); Cartwright v. Cook, 3 Barn. and Ad. 701 (1832). Action
should be brought on the new agreement: Billings v. Vanderbeck, 23 Barb.
546 (N. Y., x857). The intention to accept the promise in satisfaction may
appear expressly or by implication. Morehouse v. The Bank, 98 N. Y. 503
(3885). Although it has been held that the intention must be expressly dedared. Brunswick etc. R. R. i,. Clem, 8o Ga. 534 (I888).. In Evan v. Powis,
x Exch. 6oi (1847), it was left to the jury whether the plaintiff agreed to accept
the agreement itself, which was oral, or the performance, as a satisfaction of
the debt. When there were two notes it was left to the jury to determine whether the one was given in satisfaction of the other. Hartv. Boiler, IS
Sarg. & Rawle 162 (Pa., 3826). Where the agreement is in writing the
court ascertains what the intention was. Fields v. Aldrick, 162 Mass. 587

(1895).

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-CONTINGENT FEES-SETTLEMENT OF Sur--In &

cause of action arising out of criminal conversation, the plaintiff employed an
attorney upon an agreement to pay him a percentage of the damages recovered
and not to settle the suit without the attorney's consent. After complaint
had been served, the plaintiff did settle with the defendant. In a proceeding
by the attorney to have judgment by default entered against the defendant for
the amount of damages claimed by plaintiff, it was held that the agreement not
to settle the suit was void as against public policy and that the cause of action,
being for personal injury, was unassignable and that consequently the attorney
had acquired no legal or equitable interest therein by virtue-of the agreement
which was not barred by the settlement. Howard v. Ward, 139 N. W. Rep.
771 (S. D., 1913).
In England a barrister cannot enter into any valid agreement with a client.
kennedy v. Brown, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 676 (x863); II Am. Law Reg.357. See
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also Mooney v. Lloyd, 5 S. and R. 411 (Pa., i819). Agreements for the payment of fees conditioned upon the suceess of the suit have been regarded as
champertous and therefore void in England, Penrice v. Parker, Finch's R. 75
(1673); in many early American decisions, Thurston v. Percival, i Pick. 415
(Mass., 1823); Bachus v. Byron, 4 Mich. 535 (1857); Arden v. Pattersen, 5 Johns.
C.
(N. Y., 1821); Potts v. Francis, 43 N. C. 3oo (1852); and in a few later
cases.
Lanc.
v. Graves,
Ind. App.
499 170
(I9I1);
Gammons
v. the
Johnson,
69 Minn.
88 Twp.
-(187);
Kelly v.48Kelly,
86 Wis.
(1893).
But in
great
majority of jurisdictions such agreements, although often deprecated, are not.
today held invalid. Taylor v. Iemiss, xio U. S. 42 (x883); Davis v. Webber,
66 Ark. i9o (1899); Coker v. Oliver, 4 Ga. App. 728 (19o8); Etzel v. Duncan,
76 Atl. 493 (Md., 19o); Blaisdell v. Ahemr, x44 Mass. 393 (1887); Wilson v.
eeber, 72 N. J. Eq. 523 (i9o7); Matter of Fitzsimons, 174 N. Y. i (igo3)
Perry v. Dicken, zo5 Pa. 83 (i884); Beagles v. Robertson, Z35 Mo. App. 3o6
(igog); unless unconsciortable or fraudulent. Robinson v. Slarjs,:zoi
5i86
(i9o); Balsbaugh v. Frazer, x9 Pa. 95 (1852); Chester Co. v. Barber, 97 Pa.

455 (x18

.

..

In general choses in action, except for personal injuries, are assignable.
6 U. of P. L. R. 344. If assignable, agreement to pay contingent fees Is
usually held to operte as an equitable assignment of the resulting proceeds
pro tanto--or, more correctly, the plaintiff becomes trustee for the attorney pro
tanto. Canty v. Latterner, 31 Minn. 239 (1883); Terney v. Wilson, 45 N. J. L.
282 (I884); Harwood v. LaGrange, 137 N. Y. 538 (i893). If the chose in action
be unassignable, the agreement gives the attorney no interest in the proceeds
whatever. Weller v. Jersey City Ry. Co., 68 N. J. Eq. 659 (19o4); Miller Y.
Newell, 20 S. C. 123 (1883). On the other hand there are decisions holding that
such agreement operates as an equitable assignment of the proceeds, even thou
the cause of action arise out of personal injuries. Cain v.Hockensmit, etc., o.
157 Fed. Rep. 992 (1907); Patten v. Wilson, *34 Pa. 29 (859).
Others hold
the agreement to vest such an interest in the suit itself in the attorney as to
prevent the plaintiff from suing in forma paueris. Feil v. Wabash R. Co .,
19g Fed. Rep. 490 (1902); Phillips v. L. and N. R. Co., i53 Fed. Rep. 795 (19o7);
contra, The Oriental v. Barclay, x6 Tex. Civ. App. 193 (1897). Its affect as a
partial assignment of the chose in action itself does not seem to have been considered. Ames, Cases on Trusts, 63.
A clause in an agreement for a continent fee prohibiting the client from
settling the litigation without the attorney s consent is void as against public
policy. Matter of Snyder, i9o N. Y. 66 (1907); contra, Beagles v. Robertson,
£35 Mo. App. 306 (19o9). And, unless severable, invalidates the whole agreement, Davis v. Webber, 66 Ark. I9o (£899).
Bn.Ls An Noms-Is m

FACT THAT INraEsT Is OVaRDUz SIFF1c0n
Tittle, 129 Pac. Rep. 721

TO PuT TuE HOLDER ON NoTicE?-In McPherrin v.

(Okla., 1913) it was held that a negotiable note is not dishonored by reason of a
failure to pay interest prior to maturity of the principal in the absence of a
stipulation to that effect and a purchaser is not from that fact alone affected with
notice of prior infirmities in the title, but the fact of interest being due and
unpaid is a circumstance proper for the consideration of the jury, in connection
with other facts, on the question whether the plaintiff is a holder in good faith.
Some of the cases lay down the rule that the failure to pay interest di.honors negotiable paer, and renders it subject in the hands of the purchaser
to existing defenses between the original parties. Newell v. Gregg, 5 Barb.
263 (N. Y., 1868); First National Bank of St. Paul v. Commissioners of Scott
County, 14 Minn. 77 (1869); Hart v. Stickney, 41 Wis. 630 (1877); Chouteau
v. Allen, 70 Mo. 290,339 (1879); National Bank of Waverly v. Forsyth, 67 Minn.
257 (897).

The weight of authority, however, appearm to be the other way, and indeed
the ba ter opinion seems to be that in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary in the instrument itself, the failure to pay interest does not affect the future
negotiability of the note or bill; under this rule the bonafide holderbefore maturity takes the instrument free from equities between prior parties, although
there are arrears of interest. I Daniell on Negotiable Instruments, Fourth
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Ed., Section 787; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U. S. s, 57 (1877); Kelley v.
Whitney, g Wis. zno (1878), affirming Boss v. Hewitt, 14 W1s 260 (1862),
and overruling Hart v. Stickne supra; McLane v. Railroad Company. 66 Cal.
6o6. 632 (z885); Patterson v. Wight. 64 WiS. 289 (1885); Cooper v. Hocking
Valley National Bank. 21 Ind. Ap. 358 (x898); Cyooper v. Merchant' Natioal
Bank. 25 Ind. App. 341, 345 (zgoo); U. S. National Bank v. Floss, 38 Ore. 68
(goo). The theory upon which this rule is based is that the interest is a mere
incident and not a part of the original indebtedness represented by the instrument. Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, Section 297.
Under a number of authorities, however, the nonpayment of interest is not
to be entirely disregarded; while it will not of itself be taken to amount to.a
dishonor of the paper, yet failure to pay interest is sometimes said, as in our
principal case, to be'a fact proper to be considered by the jury in connectioa
with other circumstances on the question whether the holder has taken the paper
in good faith and- wihout actual or constructive notice of exi-ting defense.
National Bank of'Nbtth America v. Kirby. zo8 Mass. 497, 502 (87z); Martin
and Bliss v. Railway Company, 79 Ala. 59o (t885); Savings Bank v. Couse,
124 N. Y. Sup. 79 (19Xo).
BI.LS AND No"Es-PucarAsEn

WiTmouT NOTICz-BoxA FiDEs-A, having

executed a mortgage to B to secure a note payable to B, sold the property expressly subject to the mortgage to C who agreed to pay the note. B likewise
transferred the note to C who, before maturity, transferred both the property
and the note to D for value. Held, that these facts were sufficent to show that
D knew or should have known that A had an equity or defense to the notice and.
being therefore not a holder without notice, could not recover. Judy v. Warne,
1oo N. E. Rep..483 (Ind., 1913).

As to what amounts to notice or bad faith, sufficient to negative the right
of a purchaser for value before maturity to recover, the decisions, before the
N. I. L., were not uniform. In Gill v. Cubit, 3 B. and C. 466 (1824), Lord
Tenterden established gross negligence as the test. This was followed in the
early American cases and is recognized in a few states today. Did the holder
have knowledge of circumstances that would lead L reasonably prudent man
to make inquiry? Pennington Bk. v.. Bank, zo Minn. 263 (19so); Farthing
v. Dark, 109 N. C. 291 (z891); Mee v. Carlson, 22 S. D. 365 (igo8) Pierson v.
Huntington, 82 Vt. 482 (19o).
The doctrine of Gill v.Cubit, supro, has, however. been repudiated in the
majority of jurisdictions before the N. I. L. Goodman v. Harvey, 4 A. and F_.
870 (1836); Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U. S. 343 (1857); Phelan v. Moss, 67 Pa.
59 (z87o). In these jurisdictions, in the absence of actual notice, the holder'
must be shown to have had knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the
paper amounts to bad faith. Gross negligence or failure to investigate does
not make his act malafide. Murray v. Lardner, 69 U.S.110 (z864); Trust Co.
v. Wilson, t6z Mass. 8o; Cheever v. Pitts, etc. R. R. Co., %o N.Y. 59 (z896);
Second Nat. Bk. v. Morgan, 165 Pa. z99 (z895); Kavanagh v. Bank, 239 IlL
4o4 (1909); Lehman v. Press, io6 Iowa 389 (z898).
The Negotiable Instruments Law, 156, re-enacts the rule of Goodman v.
Harvey, supra. Act of May 6, 19o1, f56, P. L. 194; Allentown Nat. Bk. v.
Clay Sup. Co., 217 Pa. 128 (1907). N. Y. Laws of 19o9, Ch. 43, N. I. L. 195;
Eisenberg v. Selfkowitz, 142 N. Y. App. 569 (191s).
CAxRIRs--BAGoAG-The meaning of the term "baggage" depends upon
the peculiar circumstances of each case; but the contract to transport imposes
the duty of transporting a reasonable amount of hand baggage, such as is commonly taken by travelers for their personal use, the quantity and value of which
depends upon the passenger's station in life and the purpose of his journey.
Sherman v. Pullman Co., 139 N. Y. Suppl. 51 (1913). In this case the plaintiff,
a woman, lost a necklace through the negligence of a porter of the defendant
company and recovery was allowed since the property was suited to the plainlife.
tiff's Itposition
is well in
settled
that sleeping-car companies are not common carriers of
the goods of passengers nor are they liable as innkeepers. Lewis v. Sleeping
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(7ar Co., 143 Mass. 267 (1887); Sealing v. Pullman Car Co., 24 Mo. App. 29
(0886); Adams v. Steamboat Co., ii N. Y. 163 (1896); but they are under a
duty to use reasonable care to guard the passenger from theft, and if, through
want of such care, the personal effects of a passenger, such as he might reasonably carry with him, are stolen, liability attaches. Pullman Car Co. v. Arents,
28

Tex. Civ. App. 71

(1902);

Carpenter v. R. R. Co.,

124

N. Y. 53 (1891).

As to what amounts to luggage is a question which depends solely upon the
individual facts of each case. Yazoo R. R.v. Blockman, 8 Miss. 7 (z9o4). Generally those things are considered as personal baggage which a passenger carries
with him for his personal use and convenience on his journey. Withey v. Pere
Marquette R. Co., x41 Mich. 412 (19o5). And what baggage is reasonably
necessary invariably depends upon the traveler's position in life. Dibble v.
Brown, 12 Ga. 217, (1852); R. R. v. Froloff, xoo U. S. 24 (1879); Phelps v. London R. Co., ig C. B. (N. S.) 321 (1865).
Hence, the range of articles which have fallen within the term must necessarily be as diversified as individual tastes and habits. Some of them
are: Money sufficient for the journey, Dunlap v. International Co., 98 Mass.
371 (1867); Hickax v. Nangatuck R. R. Co., 31 Conn. 281 (1863); jewelry,
Pettigrew v. Barnum, ii Md. 434 (1857); Maurity v. N. Y. R. R. Co., 23 Fed.
765 (1884); firearms, R. R. Co. v. Ruard, 74 Ark. 125 (i9O5); but otherwise
when the traveler is not a sportsman, Cooney v. Pullman Co., 121 Ala. 368
(1898); fishing tackle, Macrow v. G. W. R. R., L. R. 6 Q. B. 612 (1871); tools
of a mechanic, Porter v. Hildebrand, 14 Pa. 129 (185o); hunting dog, Kansas
City R. Co. v. Higdon, 94 Ala. 286 (189I); a snuff box, writing paper, and ink,
Grant v. Newton, r E. D. Smith 95 (i85o); a telescope, Cadwallader v. R. R.
Co., 9 Low. Can. 169 (1858). And the fact that the articles are not to be used
on the journey does not preclude them from being considered as baggage. Curtis v. R. R., H. N. Y. x6 (878); R. R. Co. v. Baldwin, 113 Tenn. 205 (1905);
Toledo R. R. Co. v. Hammond, 33 Ind. 379 (1870).
On the other hand, money in excess of a reasonable amount does not fall
within the general meaning. Jordon v. Fall River Co., 59 Mass. 69 (1849);
Whitmore v. Steamboat Caroline, 20 Mo. 513 (1855); so, too, where jewelry is
not owned by the traveler, Belfast R. Co. v. Keys, 9 H. L. 556 (186); Metz
v. L R. Co., 85 Cal. 329 (i89o); likewise, where the goods carried are intended
for sale and not for the owner's private use. Pardee v. Drew, 25 Wend. 459
(N. Y. 1841).
Whether such articles are baggage is in most jurisdictions a question of law
for the court. Humphreys v. Perry, 148 U. S. 627 (893); Connolly v. Warren,
xo6 Mass. 146 (1870); Kansas R. R. v. Morrison, supra; conlra, Oakes v. N. P.
R. Co., 20 Ore. 392 (i89i); Ouimet v. Henshaw, 35 Vt. 605 (863).
CARRIERS--LmITATiON OF LIABnLiTy'-A stipulation on a second class
railway ticket provided that the value of baggage transported under it should
not exceed $xoo, that the ticket must be signed by the purchaser and that all

baggage valued in excess of $ioo might be transported "at proportionate rates;"

it was held that notwithstanding such contract, the passenger could recover the
full value of the baggage, $783.95, where the loss was oqcasioned by the negli-

gence of the carrier. Zetler v. Tonopah and G. R. Co.,

129

Pac. Rep. 299 (Nev.,

1913).
The common law rule is that a common carrier may, by a just and reasonable contract, relieve itself of its common law liability as an insurer. This rule
is universally recognized. But the rule is equally as well settled and almost
as universally maintained that the carrier cannot contract to relieve itself from
liability for loss or damage which is the result of its own negligence or that of
its servants. N. Y. C. and H. R. I v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (U. S. S. C.,
1873); Southern Express Co. v. Barnes, 46 Ga. 532 (1867); Buckland v. Adams
Express Co., 97 Mass. 124 (1867); to this latter rule there had been but three
exceptions. In New York, a common carrier can limit its liability, for any
degree of negligence on its part, even gross negligence, where the contract ex-

pressly provides for such exemption and is founded on a valuable consideration.

Wilson v. N. Y. C. and H. R. R., Z7 N. Y. 87(I884); Cragin v. N. Y. C. and H.
R. R., 5I N. Y. 61 (1872). In Illinois and Wisconsin the rule seems to be that
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carriers may, by special contract, limit their liability where the loss or injury
results from their negligence, except where such negligence is gross. R. R Co.
v. Davis, 159 I1. 53 (1895); Wabash R. R. v. Brown, 152 I1.484 (1894); Abrams
v. R. R., 87 Wis. 485 (1894); Lawson v. R. R., 64 Wis. 455 (1885).
Of late years, however, there is a distinct tendency to allow the carrier to
limit its liability to a certain value agreed upon between the shipper and carrier,
with certain restrictions. This tendency was first recognized and applied in
the leading case of Hart v. P. R. R., 112 U. S. 331 (1884). It has been followed ever since in the federal courts, Caw v. R. R., 194 U. S. 427 (1904); Arthur
v. R. R., 204 U. S. 505 (i9o6); in one case going so far as to limit the liability
to $50 where goods were actually worth $15,ooo. Pierce Co. v. Wells Fargo
Co., 189 Fed. 561 (1911). The Pennsylvania courts have refused to follow it,
Hughes v.. R. R., 202 Pa. 222 (1902); Grogan v. Adams Express Co., 114 Pa.
Iowa, Kansas, Texas and Kentucky, either on account of con523 (x886).
stitutional or statutory enactment, do not follow it and from the principal case,
we see that Nevada has not followed it, though the question was treated very
summarily and there was a vigorous dissenting opinion. The other states of the
Union have adopted the rule with varying restrictions. Murphy v. Wells Fargo.
99 Minn. 230 (r9o6); Larsen v. Oregon Short Line, Ito Pac. Rep. 983 (Utah,
191o); High Co. v. Adams Express Co., 63 S. E. Rep. 1125 (Ga., 19o9).
It can safely be said, however, that all the courts are tending toward the
position taken by the Interstate Commerce Commission in In re Released Rates,
13 Inter. Commerce Reports 550 (i9o8), where the rule of Hart v. Penn. R. R.,
supra,is recognized and approved and worked out reasonably. The decision of
the Interstate Commerce Commission, supra, has been adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in three cases decided in January, 1913; Adams Express
Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; C. B. and Q. v. Miller, 226 U. S. si3; C. St.
P. M. and 0. v. Latta, 226 U. S. 5ig.
CoNTEMPT-EDITORIALs-CAusE PENDING-Certain editorials and articles

directly charged that the court corruptly rendered the decision in a certain case
then pending, and that it was rendered by reason of a political trade, and not on
the law and facts; it was hed that such publications were a direct attack upon
the court as a court and the basis of a contempt proceeding. McDougall, AttyGen. v. Sheridan, 128 Pac. Rep. 954 (Idaho, 1913).
This seems to be in accord with the almost universal rule that publications
concerning a pending cause, trial, or judicial investigation, constitute contempt
when calculated to prejudice or prevent fair and impartial action, In re Cheeseman, 49 N. J. L. I15 (1886); Respublicav. Oswald. I Dail.3i9 (Pa., 1788); Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Dry Goods Co., 92 Fed. 774 (1899); or which seek to influence
judicial action by threats or other forms of intimidation, Burke v. Territory,
2 Okla. 499 (1894); State v. Bee Pub. Co., 6o Nebr. 282 (1900); or which reflect
upon the court, counsel, parties, or witnesses, respecting the cause, People v.
Wilson, 64 I1. 195 (1872); People v. Stapleton, 18 Colo. 568 (1893); Field v.
Thornell, xo6 Iowa 7 (i898); or which tend to corrupt or embarrass the due administration of justice, U. S. v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. No. IS, 383.
In Re Providence Journal Co., 28 R. I. 489 (1907), it was held that
an editorial misstatement of the law as stated in a court's written opinion on a
matter of wide application and importance is, although unintentional, a contempt of the court; and in some states, inaccurate publication of a court's decision is, by statute, made a contempt of court. People ex. rd./. Barnes v. Court
of Sessions, 147 N. Y. 290 (189$); State ex tel. Haskell v. Faulds, 17 Mont. 140
(1895); Re Robinson, 117 N. C. 533 (1895). But the doctrine supported by
the weight of authority is that a criticism of the action of the court in a matter
then terminated does not constitute contempt. State v. Anderson, 40 Iowa
207 (1875); Storey v. People, 79 I1. 45 (1875); Watson v. People, 11 Colo. 4
(1888); State v. Kaiser. 20 Or. 50 (i89o); Re Shannon, ii Mont. 67 (189i).
CoRponaToNs-CoNmRAcr By MAjoxTry STocKnOLDER FOR OWN BENFrr.
-PUBLIC POLIcY-The holder of the majority of the stock of a corporation

sold part of his stock under an agreement with the vendee that they should
vote their stock together and thus control the board of directors. The purpose
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of this control was to bring about the election of the vendee as secretary of the
corporation at a lucrative salary. This agreement was to be revocable only by
mutual consent. Iehd-the contract is unenforceable as against public policy.
Gilchrist v. Hatch, ioo N. E. Rep. 473 (Ind., 1913).
It is a general proposition that a contract by a director or a majority stockholder whereby he undertakes, in consideration of a private benefit or advantage
accruing to himself, to secure the appointment of another to a position of profit
in the corporation, is against common honesty and, hence, against public policy.
Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501 (1876); Noel v. Drake, 28 Kan. 265 (1882);
Forbes v. McDonald, 54 Cal. 98 (188o). Even where there is no direct private
gain to the stockholder, his mere agreement to keep another person permanently"
in office in the corporation, is void. West v. Camden, I3 U. S. 507 (1890).
An agreement by the majority stockholders that a person buying stock from them
shall be elected general manager for a stated period and that he may, at the
end of such period sell back the stocks to them at a fixed price, is void. Wilbur v. Stoepel, 82 Mich. 344 (189o). A contract made by a stockholder, upon
consideration, to vote for an increase in the salary of one of the corporation
officials, is illegal and cannot be enforced. Woodruff v. Wentworth, 133 Mass.
3o9 (1882). In Cone v. Russel, 48 N. J. Eq. 208 (4891), a proxy for five years
was given so as to unite enough stock to control the corporation. The holder
of the proxy agreed that the person giving it should have an office at a large
salary. This agreement was held void as against public policy. In Fuller v.
Dame, 35 Mass. 472 (1836), a corporation which owned land agreed to give
some of its stock to a shareholder in a railway corporation in return for his procuring the location of a railway station upon the land in question. This agreement was held void on the ground of public policy.
The cases here considered must be distinguished from cases in which the
contract for election to a corporation office in consideration of a purchase of
stock by the person to be elected, is entered into by all the stockholders of the
corporation, or with their consent. Such a contract is valid and binding.
Kantzler v. Bensinger, 214 Ill. 589 (i9o5); Faulds v. Yates, 57 I1. 416 (1870);
Lorillard v. Clyde, 86 N. Y. 384 (1881).
CORPORATIONs-RIGHTS

OF

STOCKHOLDERS

IN

EQUITY

AGAINST

THE

Pollitz v. Wabash R. Co., ioo N. E. Rep. 721 (N. Y., 1912),
it was said that a stockholder could maintain a bill to set aside an agreement
entered into by the directors of a corporation and another concern, whereby the
directors secured stock of the corporation for grossly inadequate consideration,
but that an answer would be sufficient on demurrer if it admitted that the directors did receive the stock of the corporation in return for full and adequate consideration and if it alleged that this transaction was subsequently ratified by
vote of the stockholders or by their acquiescence.
Clearly action by the directors which is ultra vires, or which amounts to a
fraudulent disposition of the corporate property to the injury of the shareholders' right to a part of the dividends and capital, cannot be ratified by a vote
of the majority of the stockholders. Such a transaction can be set aside by
equity on motion of a- stockholder if he shows that the corporation itself has
refused to bring such a suit. Atwood v. Merryweather, L. R. 5 Eq. 464 (1867);
Meiner v. Hooper Telegraph Works, L. R. 9 Ch. Ap. 35o (1874); Russell v.
Wakefield Water Works, L. R. 2o Eq. Cases 474 (1875); Tomkinson v. Southeastern Ry. Co. L. R. 35 Ch. D. 675 (1887); Von Arnim v. American Tube
DIRECTORs-In

Works, 188 Mass. 515 (1905); Continental Co. v. Belmont, 2o6 N. Y. 7

(1912);

Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331 (U. S., 1855).
The stockholder must, in his complaint, set forth a cause of action in
favor of the corporation with the same details as would be necessary in a suit
by the corporation itself and also he must allege that the board of directors has
refused to act and that the stockholders have either ratified the act or that the
persons who have participated in the fraudulent transaction control a majority
of the votes. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450 (i881); Russell v. Wakefield
Water Works, L. R. 2o Eq. Ca. 474 (1875). Where, however, the body of stockholders has no adequate power or authority to remedy the wrong asserted, it
is unnecessary to require an application to it to redress the wrong before bring.
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iog the representative action. Continental Securities Company v. Belmont,
206 N. Y. 7, 19 (192); Von Arnim v. American Tube Works, 188 Mass. 55
(i9o6). Certainly it is sufficient to show that no application was made because
of the apparent futility, as where the wron doers control the board of directors
and the stockholders. Del. and Hudson Co. v. Albany and Susquehanna, 213
U. S. 435 (i9o8); Russel v. Wakefield, supra.
On the other hand if the transaction is not fraudulent, if it is intravires, but
amounts to a technical breach of trust, and if adequate consideration is given
so that there is no appreciable reduction of the assets the it is merely voidable
and may be cured or ratified by the vote of the shareholders or by their acquiescence. Beatty v. N. W. Transp. Co., L. R. 12 App. Co. 589 (1887); Foss v.
Harbottle, 2 Hare461 (Pa., 1843); Sklnnerv. Smith, 134 N. Y. 241 (1892); Kelley
v. Newburyport etc. Co., III Mass. 496 (x886); Thompson on Corporations
(2d Ed.) §1223, §2043. This is true even though the interested directors control a majority of the stock. United States Steel Corporation v. Hodge, 64
N. J. Eq. 814 (1903); Russell v. Patterson Co., 232 Pa. ':3 (1gt9). But the
majority cannot by its vote ratify a fraudulent contract which wastes the assets
of the corporation. Russell v. Patterson Co., supra; Klein v. Independent
Brewing Ass'n., 231 Ill. 594 (1907). If the directors are interested personally
in the transaction the burden rests on them of showing that it would be advantageous to the corporation. Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co., 64 N. J. Eq.
673 (19o3).
EVIDENCE-STATE OF MiND-REs GEsTA-In Ickes v. Ickes, 237 Pa.
582 (13), an action by a wife against her father-in-law for the alienation of
her husband's affections, it was said that statements made by the husband one
day before his desertion of the plaintiff to the effect that he was leaving her
because of her infidelity, were admissible to prove the state of mind of the husband at the time of the desertion and his reasons for so acting. The lower court
.excluded evidence of this statement on the ground that it was not part of the
res geste.
The exception to the rule against hearsay evidence in favor of statements
indicative of the state of mind of the declarant and the rule admitting proof
of verbal acts as part of the res gestae are based on two entirely different theories.
Declarations are oftentimes the best and only evidence of the state of mind,
hence this exception to the hearsay rule. On the other hand an act or course
of conduct is frequently ambiguous, and, therefore, contemporaneous statements are admitted to explain it. NVigmore on Evidence, Vol. 3, §1725, §1772.
Where the state of mind is an essential element, as in cases of fraud or domicile,
and whenever an intent, coupled with an act, are necessary, proof of the intbent
can be made by statements made at the time the act is done. So too from
statements made within a reasonable time before or after the act the intent with
which the act was done may be inferred. Viles v. Waltham, 157 Mass. 542
(893); Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 18o (1892); Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U. S. 285 (1892). That actions for alienation of affection
and criminal conversation involve the same elements would appear from the
following citations and, therefore, the same rules of evidence should apply:
Rose v. Mitchell, 21 R. I. 270 (1899); State v. Robinson, 57 Md. 14 (i881); Wigmore §1730.
In several cases, however, statements of the recreant spouse are admitted
only when part of the res gestae of the act of desertion, or of some other act or
conduct relevant to the case. Higham v. Vanosdol, iox Ind. 16o; Bennett v.
Smith, 21 Barb. 439 (N. Y., 1856) ; Gilchrist v. Bale, 8 Watts 355 (Pa., 1839);
Kidder v. Lovell, 14 Pa. 214 (1850). Statements made prior to the desertion
have been admitted to prove the state of the affections of the speaker at that
time. Preston v. Bowers, 13 Ohio I (1861); Perry v. Lovejoy, 49 Mich. 529
(1893). Prior statements were admitted in one case where they were made in a
conversation between the defendant and the unfaithful husband to show: first,
that the defendant had used no improper persuasion; and, second, that the
husband had reasons of his own for leaving the plaintiff, Bailey v. Bailey, 94
Iowa 548 (1895). Communication between husband and wife has been admitted
to show the state of their affections. Sexton v. Sexton, 129 Iowa 487 (19O5);
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Billings v. Albright, 66 App. Div. 239 (N. Y., x9oz). In the latter case, statements by the wife to third persons were not admitted, on the ground that they
were not part of the res gestae. Subsequent statements were excluded in Lyon.
v. Lyon, 197 Pa. 212 (9oo); but were admitted in Rose v. Mitchell, 21 R. I.
270 (1899).
GUARANrY-SUBROGATION-Where A guaranteed the performance of a
contract by B with C, and where B gave a note in payment to C which C indorsed
to D, a holder for value, it was held that D was subrogated to C's right of action
against A on his contract of guaranty. B and C were both insolvent. Catskill
Bank v. Dumary, ioo N. E. Rep. 423 (N. Y., 1913). The court considered this
contract of guaranty by a stranger just as much a part of the trust fund for the
satisfaction of the debt as were goads or securities set aside by the principal
debtor himself.
The right of subrogation is purely equitable, there need be no privity of
contract to entitle a person to it. All that is necessary is that he shall not be
a volunteer. Cottrell's App., 23 Pa. 294 (1854). The theory is that goods or
securities set aside by the debtor, either in the hands of the surety or of the
creditor, or of trustees for the payment of this debt, become a trust fund. possessed of all the peculiarities of such property. If the surety discharges the
obligation he is entitled to the collateral in the hands of the creditor. If the
surety is insolvent the creditor will be substituted to the security in the hands
of the surety. Sheldon on Subrogation, p. 238. Some jurisdictions invoke
this equity even as to the original obligation, and give the surety whatever
preferences or privileges it may possess. But this is more on the theory that
there has been an equitable assignment than that it is a part of the trust fund
to secure the debt it represents. Lumpkin v. Mills, 4 Ga. 343 (1848); Ex parts
Ware, 5 Rich Eq. 473 (S. C., 1853). But in England, the original obligation
is extinguished whether paid by principal or by surety. Copis v. Middleton,
i Turn. and Russ. 224 (1823).
The principal case raises the question whether a guaranty given by a third
person, a stranger to the original contract, to the surety that the principal will
perform his contract and pay the notes when mature, is collateral to which the
creditor is entitled in case of the insolvency of the surety. In permitting subrogation, this case seems to be contra to the decided weight of opinion. The frequently repeated and applied rule is'that the creditor is not entitled to such indemnity given by a third person to save the surety harmless. Taylor v. Bank,.
87 Ky. 398 (1888); Black v. Kaiser, 91 Ky. 422 (1891); Liggett v. McClelland,
39 Ohio 624 (884); Hampton v. Phipps, io8 U. S. 26o (1882); O'Neill v. Bank,
34 Mont. 521 (19o6); Seward v. Huntington, 94 N. Y. io4 (1883); Brandt,
Suretyship and Guaranty (3d Ed.), Vol. I, §361.

HOmICIDE-MuRDER

IN

FiRsT DEGREE-CONSTRUCTIVE

INTENT-The

accused, upon finding another man with a girl to whom he had been paying attention, shot the man, after whose escape, the accused shot and killed the girl,
but without deliberation or premeditation. It was held that the intent necessary for a conviction for first degree murder could not be supplied by construction because: (x) The homicide was not connected with the felonious assault
upon the man; (2) The felonious assault upon the girl had been merged with
the homicide; People v. Spohr, too N. E. Rep. 444 (N. Y., 1912).
As to the first point the court was merely carrying out the doctrine of People
v. Huter, 184 N. Y. 237 (19oo), where the defendant unintentionally shot a
policeman several blocks from the house he had been robbing, and it was held
not to be a murder in the commission of the burglary. Contra, State v. Brown,
7 Ore. 186 (z879); Conrad v. State, 75 Ohio 52 (i9o6).
The theory of the court in the second point is, that under this statute
(Consol. Laws, 1909, c. 40), the accused can only be convicted of first degree
murder when he kills with a premeditated and deliberate design to take life.
Therefore, if the jury could consider that the accused was in the commission of
a felony which resulted in the death of the girl, but without the premeditated
and deliberate intent to take her life, the distinction made by the statute would
be abolished and the result would be the same as at common law. They state
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the rule to be "to constitute murder in the first degree by the unintentional
killing of another while engaged in the commission of a felony, we think that,
while the violence may constitute a part of the homicide, yet the other elements
constituting the felony in which he is engaged must be so distinct from that of
tn.e homicide as not to be an ingredient of the homicide, indictable therewith' or
convictable thereunder."
But for a contra doctrine see State v. Nueslein, 25 Mo. 126 (1857), "The
wilfully and maliciously inflicting great bodily harm upon another is a felony
under our statute of crimes and punishments. Therefore, although the jury
may believe that the prisoner did not in this case strike the deceased with the
stick with the specific intent to kill her at the time, but with the design maliciously to inflict upon her great bodily harm, and the deceased came to her death
by wounds inflicted under such circumstances, then such killing is murder in
the first degree."

Accord, Josey v. State, 137 Ga. 773 (1912).

HomicIDE-SELF DEFENsr-In Alabama, in atrial for homicide, the lower
court refused to instruct the jury that "if the cirtumstances attending the killing were such as to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he was in danger
of great bodily harm or death, and he honestly believed such to be the case, then
he had the right to shoot the deceased in his own defense, although as a matter
of fact, he was not in actual danger." Held-This was error, and the instruction should have been given. Chancy v. State, 59 So. Rep. 604 (Ala., 1912).
To sustain a plea of self-defense, the accused must show that he actually
apprehended danger and acted on such apprehension. State v. Gentry, 125
N. C. 733 (1899); Pugh v. State, 132 Ala. i (i9oi). It is enough if the danger
which he seeks to avert is apparently imminent, irremediable and actual.
Kepley v. People, 215 Ill.
358 (1905); People v. Thomson, 145 Cal. 717 (195o).

A bona .fide belief in imminent danger, in the careful and proper use of his faculties, and on reasonable grounds for such belief is, accordingly, sufficient although
the accused is mistaken as to the existence or imminence of the danger. Johnson v. State, 79 Miss. 42 (19oi); State v. Brown, 5 Penn. 339 (Del.,
19o5); Chaney v. State, supra.

The party attacked is not excusable in using greater force than is necessary to repel the attack. Oliver v. State, 17 Ala. 587 (1849); Com. v. Dougherty, 107 Mass. 243 (1871). The right of self defense commences when the
necessity, real or apparent, begins; and it ends when the necessity ceases. Hobbs
v. State, 16 Tex. App. 517 (1884).
There must not only have been danger or a pparent danger to the accused,
but he must have apprehended such danger, andmust really have acted under
the influence of fear, and not in a spirit of revenge. Draper v. State, 4 Baxt.
246 (Tenn., 1874); Walker v. State, 97 Ga. 350 (1895); Appleton v. People, 171

IIL. 473 (1898).

JUDGMENTS-COLLATERAL A'rAcK-An action was brought to quiet title

to certain land, and it was alleged that an order of court directing plaintiff, a
guardian, to sell the land was procured by fraud. Held-The suit was a direct
attack on the order and not a collateral attack, as one of its ultimate purposes
was to set aside the order of sale. Brown v. Trent, 128 Pac. Rep. 895 (Old.,
1912).
The court, in discussing the question said, "Expressions will be found indicating that an attack upon the judgment by an independent suit and not by
an appeal is a collateral attack; but these expressions are inaccurate. ....
An attack upon a judgment for fraud in its ?rocurement is a direct attack over
which the courts of equity take jurisdiction.
A collateral attack on a judgment is any proceeding which is not instituted
for the express purpose of annulling, correcting or modifying such decree. A
bill in equity to obtain relief from a judgment should, accordingly, be considered a collateral attack within this definition, because it is not within the
power of the court to annul, vacate or modify the judgment. The better view
is,
therefore, contra to the principal case. The court of equity merely inquires
whether there are any equitable circumstances to prevent the person in whose
favor the judgment was recovered from enforcing or taking advantage of it;
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the judgment complained of is permitted to stand and is not set aside. Freeman on judgments, Section 485; Morrill v.. Morrill, 20 Oregon 96 (189o), with
extensive notes in 23 Am. St. Rep. 117: Oneil v. Potoin, 13 Idaho 721 pI907);
Insurance Co. v. Mobley, 90 S. C. 552 (1911). Some courts make a distinction
and hold that suits in equity to set aside judgments at law are indirect, and not
e Mesnager v. Variel, 144 Cal. 463 (19o4); Eichhoff v.
exactly collateral.
Eichhoff, 107 Cal. 42 (189 ).
In accord with the principal case, the following cases may be cited: McNeill v. Edie, 24 Kans. xo8 (r88o); Smith v. Morrill, 12 Col. App. 233 (1898);
Houser v. Bonsai, 149 N. C. 51 (19o8).
JUD.MENTS--CONCLUSiVENESs---In

a second suit between the same parties

for a different cause of action, the former decision is conclusive only as to the
questions and right actually decided therein and nothing more. So the dismlsal of a former bill by the defendant to remove the cloud from his title did not
preclude his defense in an action to account for coal and timber subequently
taken from the land. Hudson v. Iguano Land and Mining Co., 76 S E. Rep.

797 (W. Va.,

1912).

The case is a good application of the rule as laid down in the leading case
of Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. . 35 (1876). Where the cause of action
and the parties are identical a judgment is conclusive not only as to all matters
actually determined thereby, but also all matters which might or ought to have
been adduced to sustain or defeat the action. Cromwell v. County of Sac,
supra; Davis v. Brown, 94 U. S. 428 (1876); Cook v. Darling, 35 Mass. 393
(1836); Stokes v. Stokes, 172 N. Y. 327 (1902); Foster v. Wells, 4 Tex. 1oz (1894);
Fishburne v. Ferguson, 85 Va. 324 (1888); Biern v. Ray, 49 W. Va. z29 (19o).
The form of the action being immaterial. Trescott v. Lewis, 12 La. Ann. 184
(1857).
But when the second suit between the parties is for a different cause
of action, the former judgment operates as an estoppel on only such matters
as were actually determined and shown to be determined. Cromwell v. County
of Sac, supra; Davis v. Brown, supra; Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 6o6 (1876);
De Sollar v. Hanscome, 158 U. S. 216 (1894); Oregonian R. Co. v. Oregon R.
and Nay. Co., 27 Fed. 277 (1886); Bown v. Schintz, zog IlL App. 598 (1903);.
Crandall v. Gallup 12 Conn. 365 (1837); Young v. Pritchard, 75 Me. 513 (1883);
City of Paterson v. Baker, 51 N. J. Eq. 49 (1893); Jones v. Beaman, 117 N. C..
259 (x895); Breading v. Blocher, 29 Pa. 347 (857); Almy v. Daniels, is R. L
312 (1886).
Or such matters as are necessarily involved. Bond v. Mark.
strum, 102 Mich. zz (1894); Stokes v. Stokes, supra. But are not conclusive
as to questions which are collateral and not actually determined.
LIBEL-INuENDO-DcLAR.ATiON-In an action for libel, the publication
contained large, flarin headlines referring to the plaintiff as "McGreary with
party arrested for kicking woman who now lies at death," etc.; but the declaration contained no innuendo. Hed-The absence of innuendo is immaterial,
and the jury was, therefore, warranted in interpreting the words to meanthat
the plaintiff was a participant in an assault and battery on the woman. McGreary v. Leader Publishing Co., 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 29 (1912).
When the defamatory character of an utterance is latent, it is necessary for
the plaintiff to explain the words and phrases and disclose their true meaning.
Burdick, Law of Torts (2d Edition) 503; Crashley v. Press Co., z79 N. Y. 27
(1904). This portion of the complaint is important; it is known as the innuendo.
But the true meaning of words cannot be extended by innuendo beyond their
natural import, aided by reference to the extrinsic facts with which they maybe
connected. Camp v. Martin, 23 Conn. 86 (1854).
The office of an innuendo is to aver the meaning of the Language published,
but if the common understanding of mankind takes hold of the publed words,
and at once, without difficulty or doubt, applies a hbelous meaning to them, an
innuendo is not needed, and if used, may be treated as useless surplusage. Ha
v. Press Co., 127 Pa. 642 (1889); Collins v. Dispatch Publishing Co., 152 Pa.

187

(1892).

The principal case, therefore, in holding that where the words are not ambqiuous no innuendo is necessary, is in accord with the general rule. Carrol v. White,
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33 Barb. 615 (N. Y., 186t); Adams v. Lawson, 17 Gratt. 250 (Va., 1865); Carter
v. Andrews, 16 Pick. (Mass., 1846).
Liams AND SLANDER-OFiCIAL DuTY--The publication of an article
stating that the district attorney had charged the sheriff with being derelict in
his duty and would bring proceedings to have him removed from office was held
libelous per se, regardless of whether the act charged was a violation of the
sheriff's official duty or not. Hagener v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 152 S. W. Rep.
107 (Nev., 1912).

The case follows the recognized doctrine as to public officers or employes.
Words,. though not actionable in themselves, may become so by charging misconduct in office in two ways: (x) If they impute acts punishable by indictment
which would not be so if done by a person not in office. Allen v. Hillman. i
Pick. io (Mass., i8i3); Taylor v. Kneeland, I Dougl. 67 (Mich., i843); Gore
v. Blethen, :I Minn. -So (1874); Harris v. Terry, 98 N. C. 13t (1887). (2) If
they tend to disgrace and disparage one in an office of profit or honor, and to
deprive him of it. Allen v. Hillman, supra. And it is not necessary that they
should import a charge of crime. Sillars v. Collier, 151 Mass. 50 (1890); Gore
v. Blethen, supra. While any language, whether written or spoken, imputing
want of integrity, lack of due qualification, or a dereliction of dutyis actionable
per se. Wofford v. Meeks, 129 Ala. 349 (igoo); Rea v. Wood, 1o5 Cal. 314.
(1894); Prosser v. Callis, 117 Ind. 1o5 (1888); Evening Post Co. v. Richardson,
113 Ky. 64! (1902); ilgore v. Newspaper Co., 96 Md. 16 (1902); Sillars v. Collier, supra; Hay v. Reid, 85 Mich. 296 (i8gx); Martin v. Paine, 69 Minn. 482
(1897); Heller v. Duff, 62 N. J. L. io (1898); Hook v. Hackney, 16 S. and R.
385 (Pa., z827); Moss v. Harwood, 102 Va. 386 (i9o4); Smith v. Utley, 92 Wis.

133 (1i86).
But words affecting a man in his office will not be slanderous unless he is
in the office at the time of speaking. Allen v. Hillman, supra; Forward v. Adams.
7 Wend. 204 (N. Y., 1831); McKee v. Wilson, 87 N. C. 300 (1882). But to be
libelous, it is sufficient to expose the plaintiff to ridicule or contempt and degrade him in the estimation of the community, though his term of office be expired at the time of publication. Jarman v. Rea, 137 Cal. 339 (1902); Russel
v. Anthony, 21 Kan. 45o (1831); Sharp v. Laison, 67 Minn. 428 (1897); Cramer
v. Riggs, 17 Wend. 209 (N. Y., 1837); Eviston v. Cramer, 47 Wis. 659 (1879).
MASTER

AND

SERVANT-EJECTION

op

TREsPASSEEs-AuTaoRIT

O0

BRAxEnmA-A carrier is not liable to a trespasser for injuries received in being
ejected from a freight train by a brakeman, since the latter has no implied authority to do such an a-t. Harrington v. Boston and Maine Rt. R., ioo N. E.
Rep. 6o6 (Mass., 1913).

As a general principle of jurisprudence, an owner of premises owes no duty
to trespassers thereon. Wright v. Boston R. R., 129 Mass. 44o (879); Phila.
R. R. v. Hummell, 44 Pa. 375 (1862); since the courts will not aid a wrong-doer.
Kirtley v. Chicago ek. R. Co., 65 Fed. 386 (1895). But the occupier must
do him no wilful or wanton injury. Frost v. Eastern R. Co., 64 N. H; 220
(1886); Rosenthal v. New York C. R., 112 App. Div. 438 (N. Y., x9o6).
The liability in instances like the principal case is not founded upon tue
duty and obligation imposed by the law of common carriers, but is referable to
the law of agency. Faber v. Pac. Ry. Co.. x16 Mo. 81 (1893). And in order
to bind the company, it must appear that the acts of the employes were within.
the scope of their authority, express or imlied. Rathbone v. Oregon R. Co.,
40 Ore. 22 (19o); Morris v. Brown, iI i.Y.
318 (3888).
Jurisdictions which hold it is one of the implied duties of a brakeman to
eject trespassers from passenger trains do so on the theory that he is the guardian and protector of his master's property. Hoffman v. N. Y. C. R. R., 87
N. Y.25 (1881); but his actions are subject to the conductor's authority. Walker
V. ft. ft., 23LT. R. 34 (189); and he must not act in a careless or malicious
manner. Rounds v. R1. f. Co., 64 N. Y. 329 (3876). But no such implicatio.
arises in the case of a brakeman on a freight train. L.S. and M. S. Ry. Co. v.
Peterson, 344 Md. 234 (3895); Chicago and Co. Ry. v. Bracknian, 78 IL Apm
343 (3898); as his employment relates only to the exact duties which his pod-
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tion suggest. R.R. Co. v. Anderson, 8z Texass56 (1891); Cauleyv. Pittsburgh
I. R. Co., 98 Pa. 498 (1881); C. and 0. R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 94 Vir. 65o (1896);
unless he was engaged generally to remove trespassers. Marion v. R. R., $9
Iowa 428 (1832).
On the other hand, there are numerous courts which draw no distinction
between the kinds of trains as to the duties attaching to the position of a brakeman. Breng v. Chicago and Co. R. R., 64 Minn. 173 (1896); and the rightof
such a servant to eject trespassers falls within his implied duties. Hayes v.
Southern Ry. Co., 141 N. C. 195 (19o6); Folley v. R. L, 16 Okla. 32 (19go);
R. R. v. Kelly, 36 Kan. 655 (t887); Smith v. R. R. .95 Ky. it (1893). In this
line of decisions the brakeman's power to elect lies in his complete supervision
and care over the company's property. Dixon v. N. P. R. R., 37 Wash. 310
(19o).
A like difference of opinion exists where the circumstances are those of
station master in charge of a station, or a conductor in charge of a train, or an
engine driver or fireman in charge of an engine. Flower v. R. IL Co., 69 Pa.
210 (1871); Towanda Coal Co. v. Heeman, 86 Pa. 418 (1878); Polatty v. Charleston Ry. Co., 67 S. C. 391 (I9O3); Breng v. Chicago R. IL Co., supra.
MA=r AND SRRVANT--LiABLiTY oF MASv i WHEN SERvANT IS HIR D.

To ANoTHER-Where a livery stable keeper, in order to carry out a contract,

hires a team and driver from another man, and such driver in the course of the
work injuries a third party, he is not pro hac vice the servant of him to whom
the property is famished, there being no element of control exercised by the
hirer. Schmedes v. Deffaa, 138 N. Y. Suppl. 931. (1912). In this case the
defendant placed the team under the care of the party, an undertaker, for whom
the work was to be done, the latter then directing the driver to proceed to the
funeral.
A master is liable for the wrongs of his servant since the former is bound to.
see that his affairs are so conducted that others are not injured. Farwell v.
Boston etc. R. L, 4 Met. 49 (Mass., 1842); but a servant may remain the general servant of his original master and still be the servant of the person to whom•
he may be lent for particular employment. Donovan v. Laing, i Q. B. 629
(1893); Byrne v. Kansas City R. R., 6i Fed. 6o5 (r894). The test is whether.
in the particular rervice which he is engaged to perform, he continues under the
direction of his original master or becomes subject to that of the person to whom
le is hired. Geer v. Darrow, 61 Conn. 220 (i89i); Clapp v. Kemp. 122 Mas.
81 (1847); Gahagan v. Aermotor Co., 67 Minn. 252 (1897). The determining
factor is in whom the right to exeris such control exists. Sounders v. Toronto,
26 Ont. App. 265 (igoo); Dewar v. Tasker, 22 T. L. R. 303 (19o6).
Hence, where the servant so loaned out is not subject to his original master's
orders, the latter is not bound by the former's acts. Jones v. Scullard, 2 Q.
B. 565 (1898); Colter v. Lindgren, to6 CaL 602 (I895); Samuelian v. Tool Co.,
z68 Mass. 12 (1897); Weaver v. Jackson, 138 N. Y. Supp. 6"9(1913); for the
servant is then subject to the exclusive control of the hirer. DeVoir v.-Lumben
Co., 64 Wis. 616 (i885); Kimball v. Cushman, 1o3 Mass. t94 (1869); Keltoe
V. Fifer, 26 Pa. Super. 603.
But where absolute control is not vested in the hirer, the doctrine of msspondeal upcrioris applied, which renders the master of the servant liable for
injuries to third parties. Quaman v. Burnett, 6 M. and W. 499 (t84o); Laugher
v. Pointer, 5 B. and C. 547 (1826); Little v. Hacket, zz6 U. S. 366 (t886); Ames
v. Jordon, 71 Me. 540 (1880); Hershberger v. Lynch, II AtL 642 (Pa., 1887);
Fenner v. Cri , tog Iowa 455 (1899). Even where the hirer selects the driver,
J10-_n v. Ice 8., 50 Mich. 516 (185); but otherwise when injuries are attri'but
able directly to the orders of the hirer. Ewing v. Shaw, 83 Ala.
(1887).
The principal case, applying the control test of Standard Oil Co. v. Ander.
son, 212 U. S. 215 (xgo8), held the hirer not liable for the negligence
of the driver. There were two diazsenting opinions based on a difference of ideas
as the elements of control exercised by the hirer.
MEcuwcs' LrENs-MATE IU
--A contractor leased a steam shovel for
use in the construction of public works. Held-The lessor was not entitled to
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a lien for its rental, under a statute giving a lien to one who shall furnish "materials to a contractor for the construction of a public improvement.'
Troy
Public Works Co. v. City of Yonkers, ioo N. E. Rep. 700 (N. Y.. 1912).
The cases throughout the United States are in accord with the principal
case. One renting horses for use in construction work is not entitled to a lien
under a statute giving a lien to one who shall "furnish any materials, machinery,
fixtures or other things toward the building, construction, or equipment of any
railroad." St. L. I. M. and S. R. R. v. Love, 74 Ark. 528 (19o5); so also one
letting horses by the month to another to haul lumber for a third person is not
entitled to a lien upon the lumber for the r ntal thereof under a statute giving a
lien for personal services and for services of a team, upon lumber, as, by such
lease, the horses become the lessee's for the time being, and it was'he who might
have a lien for his services and the use of the horses, and not the owner thereof.
McMullin v. McMullin, 92 Me. 336 (z898); Richardson v. Hoxie, go Me. 227
(1897). Where horses are leased for use in work of a lienable nature upon logs
or lumber, the lessor is not entitled to a lien for their hire, unless used and worked
by him or his servants under a statute giving a lien upon logs or lumber to any
person perfdrming services in cutting or hauling them. Edwards v. Lumber
Co., lo8 Wis. 164 (i9oo); Lohman v. Peterson, 87 Wis. 227 (1894); Mabie v.
Sines, 92 Mich. 545 (1892). In McAuliffe v. Jorgenson, 107 Wis. 132 (1900).
it was held that one renting a well-boring machine to a contractor is not entitled
to a lien under a statute-similar to the principal case.
The states of Texas and Minnesota are the only jurisdictions in which a contrary rule has been established and there the statutes expressly provide that a
lien may be acquired by any person, etc., "who may furnish machinery, fixtures
or tools," etc., Texas, Laws i889, c. 98; and "whoever performs labor or furnishes skill, material, or machinery," Minnesota, Laws 1889, c. 200, §3 These
statutes are so radically different that the cases of Burke v. Brown, 1o Tex. Civ.
App. 298 (1895), and Perry v. Duluth Transfer Co., 56 Minn. 306 (1894), cannot be regarded as applicable to this discussion.
A lien, however, is uniformly sustained in favor of one furnishing explosives
for use in construction work. Schaghticoke Powder Co. v. R. R. Co., 76 N. E.
Rep. 153 (N. Y., 1905); Keystone Mining Co. v. Gallagher, s Colo. 23 (1879);
Cal. Powder Wks. v. Blue Tent Co., 22 Pac. 391 (Cal., 1889); Giant Powder
Co. v. San Diego Flume Co., 78 Cal. 193 (1889). The distinction between the
powder cases and the principal case being that, while the powder did not remain
in the completed construction, yet it was used up in the work, whereas the steam
shovel, teams, etc., survive the construction work and remain the property of
their owner.
NEGuGENcEr-INNKEEPER-DUTY TO INTOXicATED GuFsT-An intoxicated guest fell from a hotel porch and subsequently died of exposure. The
innkeeper, who after discovering his situation, but not his injury, allowed him
to remain there, was held not liable, the act being mere nonfeasance. Scholl
v. Belcher, 127 Pac. Rep. 968 (Ore., 1912).
It is the duty of an innkeeper to take reasonable care of his guests. Scott
v. Churchill, z5 Misc. 8o (N. Y., 1895); Sandys v. Florence, 47 L. J. C. P. 598
(1878); West v. Thomas, 97 Ala. 622 (1892); Omaha Hotel Ass. V. Walters, 23
Neb. 280 (t888). He is not, however, an insurer. Weeks v. McNulty, lox
Tenn. 49 (i8g8); Clancy.v. Barker, t31 Fed. i6t (9o4); Sheffer v. Willoughby,
63 IUI. 518 (1896). So if a defect in the premises is obvious the guest must use
reasonable care. Smeed v. Morehead, 70 Miss. 690 (1893); Bremer v. PIess,
121 Wis. 61 (19047; Ten Broek v. Wells, 47 Fed. 690 (t891).
Drunkenness does not relieve a man from the same degree of care required

of a sober man. Fisher v. R. R., 39 W. Va. 366 (1894 ); Welty v. R. R., ioS
Ind. 55 (1885); Rollestone v. Cassirer, 3 Ga. App. r6x (t9o7); Keeshan v. Elgin
Tract Co., 229 II1.533 (1907). A carrier is not bound to care for a drunken
Passenger. Statham v. R. R., 42 Miss. 607 (t869); R. R. v. Woodward, 4
Md. 268 (1874). But is bound to do nothing which, in view of his helpless condition will expose him to unnecessary danger. Weber v. R. R., 33 Kan. 543
(1885); Wheeler v. R. R., 7o N. H. 607 (igoo); Black v. R. R., .193 Mass. 448
(19o6); R. R. v. Marrs, 119 Ky. 954 (igo5).
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The doctrine of the last clear chance, that where one gratuitously assumes
control of the situation a duty arises similar to that of a gratuitous bailee, R.
R. v. State, 29 Md. 42o (1868); R. R. v. State, 41 Md. 268 (x874); Dych v. R.
R., 79 Miss. 361 (i9o); Depue v. Flatan, zoo Minn. 299 (IQ07); does not apply
because the defendant has done no affirmative act.
PROPERTY-W.ILLs-LAwFUL IssuE-The words "lawful issue," in the
absence of an expressed contrary intention, mean only those born in lawful
wedlock, and so children subsequently legitimated by the operation of a statute
will not take under such a devise. Central Trust Co. v. Skillin, 138 N.Y. SuppL
884 (1912).
The word "issue" means, primafaie, heirs of the body. Daniel v. Whartenby, 84 U. S. 639 (1873); Wright v. Gaskill, 74 N. J. Eq: 742 (1908); Beckley
v. Riegert, 212 Pa. 91 (19o5); Robins v. Quinliven, 79 Pa. 333 (1875); Klepner
v. Laverty, 70 Pa. 70 (1871); and includes all lineal descendants. Cherry
v. Mitchell, io8 Ky. I (19oo); Jackson v. Jackson, 153 Mass. 374 (x8gz); Juglia
v. McCook, 68 N. J. Eq. 27 (1904); Schmidt v. Jewett, 195 N.Y. 486 (19O);
Miller's Ap., 52 Pa. 113 (x866); Pearce v. Rickard, I8 R. I. 142 (1893). Unless
it appears that the testator intended to use it in a restricted meaning, as children, Arnold v. Alden, 173 Ill. 229 (1898); Union Safe Deposit Co. v. Dudley.

xo4 Me. 297 (i9O8); King v. Savage, 121 Mass. 3o3 (1876); Coyle v. Coyle, 73
N. J. Eq. 528 (1907); Palmer v. Dunham, 125 N. Y. 68 (189o); In re Nice, 227
Pa. 75 (i9io); Loganv. Cassidy, 71 S. C. 175(1905). Orgrandchildren, Cheotal
v. Schreiner, 48 N. Y.683 (1896); Birely's Est., 7 Pa. Dist. 395 (1898).

The words "issue," "children" and "heirs at law" have been held not to
include adopted children. Russel v. Russel, 84 Ala. 48 (x887); Wyeth v. Stone,
144 Mass. 44i (1887); Reinder v. Koppelman, 94 Mo. 338 (1887); Jenkins v.
Jenkins, 64 N. H. 407 (1887); Matter of Leask, 197 N.Y. 193 (i91o); Schafer
v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304 (1867). .Contra, Hartwell v. Teft, 19 R.. 1. 644 (1896), and
under special circumstances Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262 (1874); Warren
v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483 (1892).

The words "lawful issue" will not include illegitimate children. Black v.
Cartwell, 1o B. Mon. I88 (Ky., 1849); Olmstead v. Olmstead, igo N. Y., 458
(0go8); U. S. Trust Co. v. Maxwell, 26 Misc. 276 (N. Y., 1899). Or even the
word "issue" standing alone. Flora v. Anderson, 67 Fed. 182 (1895); Dogget
v. Mosely, 52 N. C. 587 (186o); Gibson v. McNeely, ii Ohio 13i (186o). Though
subsequently legitimated. Trust Co. v. Maxwell, supra; Hicks v. Smith, 94
Ga. 8o9 (1894); contra, Miller's Ap., 52 Pa. 113 (1866). Nor will an illegitimate
child take under "lawful issue" when by statute he had been rendered capable
of inheriting by adoption. Brisbin v. Huntington, 128 Iowa 166 (1905); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 N. H. 407 (1887).
PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS-PUBLIC AND PRIVATE Us-Where a
public service water company is given the power of eminent domain in order
t it may be able to furnish water to all customers it is entitled to condemn a
right of way for a pipe line over private property in order that it may fulfill a
contract with a railroad and other corporations, entered into for profit, and
requiring an additional supply. Such an undertaking is not a private use.
Jeter v. Vinton-Roanoke Water Co., 76 S. E. Rep. 921 (Va., 1913).
It is, of course, settled beyond doubt that taking for other than -a public
use violates the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. Matter of
Tuthill, 36 App. Div. 492 (N. Y., x899); Fallbrook Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S.
I2 (1896). So also it is undisputed that an act authorizing a taking for a private as well as a public use is utterly void unless the two provisions can be separated. Atty. Cen. v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400 (1875); Sadler v. Laughman,
ultimatcIy
34 Ala. IIa (1859).
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Haviston v. Ry. Co., 208 U. S. 58 (197). The extent of the power, of course,
varies in the different states according to their statutory provisions on the sub.
ject and the rights and privileges of any given public service corporation are
often expressly defined and lirmted in the charter.
-
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-As regards the principal case, it is generally true that a public service water
company is not obliged to supply water for all purposes to which the applicant
may wish to devote it-Wyman Pub. Ser. Cor., Vol. I, p. 233--but is only
bound to supply an amount which is reasonable for domestic use. Barnard
Castle Urban Dist. v. Wilson, 2 Ch. Dis. 813 (19or). How far such a company
is entitled, if it wishes, to supply upon a public basis for extrordinary demands
and to exercise the power of eminent domain in order to furnish such service
necessarily depends upon the terms of its charter. In the principal case the
charter of the water company was very broad in its terms, practically authorizing the company to supply all who demanded it. In the absence of such broad
provisions, however, the cases seem to hold that these water companies have
not the right to exercise the power of eminent domain in order to reach and
supply, on special contracts, various private corporations with water which is
to be employed for manufacturing purposes or in commercial processes. In re
Barre Water Co., 62 Vt. 27 (1889); Jordan v. Indianapolis Water Co., 61 N. E.
Rep. 12 (Md., 1gO); and Boonton v. United Vater Supply Co., 7o N. S. Eq.

•692 (19o6).

SALr s-WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION-If the vendor of his own accord,
without any request from the vendee, says of a horse: "You need not look for
.anything, the horse is perfectly sound," this constitutes a warranty of sound.
ness. Schowel v. Reade, Ir. Rep. (1913) 2 K. B. 64.
A warranty is an express or implied sthtement of something which the
party undertakes shall be a part of the contract yet colateral to the express
object of it. Lunt v. Wrenh, 113 III. i68 (1885). To constitute a warranty
no particular form of words is required, Warren v. Phila. Coal Co., 83 Pa.
437 (1877); therefore, the word "warrant" need not necessarily appear in the
contract. Erskine v. Swanson, 45 Neb. 767 (x895); Jones v. Quick, 28 Ind.
125 (1867).
A mere statement by the vendor of his own opinion and belief,
not amounting to a positive affirmation or statement of fact, upon a matter concerning which a purchaser is to exercise his own judgment, does not amountto
.a warranty. White v. Stelloh, 74 Wis. 435 (z889); Hillman v. Wilcox, 3o Me.
170 (1849); Tucksbury v. Bennett, 31 Iowa 83 (1871).
It is sometimes said that where the vendor states something as a fact this
constitutes a warranty. Riddle v. Webb, ixio Ala. 599 (1895). On the other
hand, it has been held that a naked averment of a fact is not a warranty, but
may be considered with other circumstances. Holmes v. Tyson, 147 Pa. 3o5
(I892). - The courts very often say that the statement must be intended and
understood by the parties to be a warranty. Mattock v. Meyers, 64 Mo. 531
(1877); McGrew v. Forsyth, 31 Iowa 179 (1870); Holmes v. Tyson, supra. If
the vendor's words show an intention to warrant and are relied on by the vendee
.as an inducement to buy, the claim by the vendor that he did not intend to
warrant is of no avail. Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 N. Y. 198 (1872); Halliday
v. Briggs, x5 Neb. 219 (1883).
It would seem that the vendee must, in most jurisdictions, rely upon the
warranty. Fairbank Canning Co. v. Metzger, 118 N. Y. 260 (189o); Watson
v. Roode, 30 Neb. 264 (189o); Evans v. Schriver Laundry Co., 57 Ill. App.
70 (1894); contra, Shordan v. Kyler, 87 Ind. 38 (1882). A test which has been
laid down as to whether a statement constitutes a warranty or not is: Does the
vendor assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or does he merely express
.an opinion on a subject on which the buyer may also be expected to use his
judgment? Kenner v. Harding, 85 I1. 264 (1877); Reese v. Bates, 94 Va. 321

(1897).

Srpctic PEa oRmANc-SALR Or LANn--EFFEcT OF FiRE-On a bill for
specific performance of a contract for sale of real estate, where fire destroyed
the buildings before the execution of the deed or payment of balance of purchase money, it was held that the vendor could not obtain specific performance
and the loss must fall upon the vendor. Good v. Jarrard, 76 S. E. Rep. 698
(S. C., 1912).
The doctrine of the principal case, that the vendor must bear the loss'by
fire or other accident happening between the making of the contract and its
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completion, is contra to the weight of authority and is followed directly in but
five other state courts: Cutcliff v. McAnally, 88 Ala. 507 (1889); Gould v.
Murch, 70 Me. 288 (1879); Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. 134 (Mass., 1838);

Wilson v. Clark, 6o N. H. 352 (188o); Powell v. Dayton Co., 12 Ore. 488 (1885).
The question is expressly left open in Vetzler v. Duffy, 78 Wis. 170 (1890).
The New York courts seem to favor the rule in the princi at case in their later
decisions, Smith v. McCluskey, 45 Barb. 6io (1866); Goldman v. Rosenberg,
u:6 N. Y. 78 (i88p); Listman v. Hickey. 65 Hun. 8 (1892); but in Listman v.
Hickey, supra, which on its facts is more nearly like the principal case, Patterson, J., based his opinion upon the fact that the contract in question was for both
real and personal property and was entire; he distinctly recognized the general
rule to be that of Paine v. Meller, infra, but distinguished this case from it on
grounds given above.

The rule followed in the majority of jurisdictions (contra to the principal
case) that the loss falls upon the vendee, was first laid down in Paine v. Meller,
6 V esey, 349 (Eng., 1801), and has been followed repeatedly in this country:
Willis v. Wozencraft, 22 Cal. 607
(t863); Sherman v. 1oehr, 57 Ill. 509 (1871);
Cottingham v. Fireman's Co., 9o Ky. 439 (1890); Skinner v. Hou hton, 92 Md.
68 (i9oo); Walker v. Owen, 79 Mo. 563 (1883); Franklin Co. v. Martin, 40 N.
J. L. 568 (t878); Gilbert v. Port, 28 Ohio 276 (1876); Dunn v. Yakish, io Old.
388 (i9oo); Elliott v. Ashland Co., 117 P4. 548 (1888); Brakhage v. Tracy, 13
D. 3V (9oo).

If t e vendor agrees expressly to deliver possession of premises in the same
condition in which they were at the time of the bargain, he must, obviously,
bear the loss resulting from fire or other accident. Marks v. Tichenor, 85 Ky.
536 (1887). It is equally clear that a person, whether he be the vendor or vendee,
must be answerable for any loss due to his own negligence. Mackey v. Bowles,
98 Ga. 730 (z896).
TRtuSTS-SAVINGS BANKs-DEPosrrs--In Stockert v. Savings Bank, 139
N. Y. Suppl. 986 (19131, it was held that the giving of the bank book of a
savings bank to the donee in connection with a deposit in the name of the donor
as trustee for the donee, created an irrevocable trust, which was not revoked
by the returning of the book at the request of the donor, in the absence of any
evidence that the donor intended to revoke the trust and that the donee consented thereto.
This follows the rule as laid down in Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112 (1904),
i. e., that if one person deposits money in his own name as trustee for another,
a tentative trust is created, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration, such as
delivery of the pass book, or notice to the beneficiary. In all jurisdictions it
seems to be well established that a deposit in trust for another is not conclusive
upon the depositor, and that no trust is created when the declarations of the
depositor and the surrounding circumstances show that such was not the intention. Kelley v. Snow, x85 Mass. 288 (1904); Barefield v. Rosell, 177 N. Y.
387 (x9 o 4 ); in re Hall, 154 Cal. 527 (:9o8); Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. St. 235 (1908).
In Massachusetts, notice to the cestui que trust during the lifetime of the
depositor is required to be shown, Clark v. Clark, io8 Mass. 522 (1871); but the
weight of authority is to the effect that such knowledge on the part of the beneficiary is not necessary either to create or evidence the existence of the trust.
Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. z34 (1878); Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212 (1899);

Merigan v. MeGonigle, 205 Pa. St.
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(1903).

Although these facts are sometimes construed, in connection with other
facts, to show an intention not to create a trust, the retention of the bank book
by the depositor, or the making of subsequent deposits and withdrawals, do. not
of themselves destroy the character of a trust of this nAture, when it is once
created and established, as it is consistent with the trust that these acts be done
by the depositor as trustee. Say. Bank v. Albee, 64 Vt. 571 (:892); Milholland
v. Whalen, supra; Meislahn v. Meislahn, 56 N. Y. App. Div. 566 (9oo); Bath
Say. Inst. v. Fogg., Ioi Me. z88 (1906).

